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Abstract
The effects of increased environmental care on optimal technology choice and
long-term growth are studied for an economy in which pollution is a
side-product of physical capital used in production. First, it is shown that
in case of a standard neoclassical production structure, the result is a
less capital-intensive production process whereas the long-run growth rate
is not affected. Next, we introduce assumptions of the endogenous growth
literature. When there are constant returns to physical capital [following
Rebelo (1991) and Romer (1986)], an increase in abatement activities crowds
out investment and lowers the endogenous growth rate. When human capital ac-
cumulation is the engine of growth [as in Lucas (1988)], physical capital
intensity declines and the endogenous optimal growth rate is unaffected by
increased environmental care or is even higher, depending on whether pol-
lution influences agents' ability to learn or not.
1. Introduction
In recent years, during which an unpolluted environment has become more
and more a scarce commodity, economists have shown an increasing interest in
environmental issues. An important question in this respect is whether the
long-run growth rate of an economy is affected by environmental care. Some
economists have argued that long-run growth rates depend on the current ef-
forts to clean up the environment, while others have argued that
environmental efforts are necessary for the short run but will not influence
long-term growth rates. In this paper we try to shed some light on the ques-
tion by applying some of the insights of the new 'endogenous growth'
l.iterature.
In the current literature on environmental issues in economics we can
distinguish three main directions. The first analyses how the intertemporal2
allocation of resources is affected by environmental issues. The classical
Ramsey problem is applied to an economy where pollution is an inevitable
side-effect of economic activity. Consumers maximise a utility functíon,
which depends on both consumption and the quality of the environment, by
choosing the level of investment, consumption and abatement activities.
ticminrrl wrn~k is carricd out by I~urstr~r (1973) whose framework is extended in
several articles [e.g. Gruver (19~6) and Luptacik and Schubert (1982)]. Some
authors, e.g. Musu (1989) and Siebert (198~), use a two-sector analysis with
one production sector and one abatement sector. A recent contribution is by
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) where both stock and flow externalities
arising from pollution are analysed in a single model. The main conclusion
of this literature is that if one allows for pollution effects in the clas-
sical Ramsey problem, the optimal capital stock is less than under the
golden rule.
A second direction in the literature focuses on the question how a
social optimum can be sustained in a market economy. Hecause pollution
causes externalities, market outcomes are inefficient and there is a role
for the government. Different instruments can be introduced like Pigouvian
taxes, markets for pollution rights, binding quota restictions and property
rights. The literature discusses the differences between these four
instruments [e.g. Dasgupta (1982) and Siebert (198~)]. It is also possible
to analyse thís question within an optimal tax framework [e.g. Gradus and
Kort (1991)] where the credibility of the government plays a role in the ef-
fectiviness of the different instruments.
In the third and more recent stream of literature the international
aspects of pollution are analysed. Hereby, different countries have dif-
ferent attitudes towards pollution and cooperation may be important [e.g.
Benhabib and Radner (1989), Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1991) and Van der
Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1991)].
Surprisingly, long-term growth aspects of environmental economics are
somewhat underexposed in the formal literature. In most models the growth
rate is exogenously given or there is even no long-term growth. In this
paper we study the relations among pollution, technology choice and optimal
growth. We are especially interested in the question how these three an-
tities are influenced if the socíety becomes more interested in
environmental care.3
In section 2 we describe the basic structure of our models and sum-
marise environmental and growth issues within the classical Ramsey context.
In section 3 we ir.corporate pollution as a disutility into the endogenous
growth literature. First, we give a brief overview of the essential
mechanisms causing endogenous growth. Second, we consider the Romer (1986)
model with constant returns to capital. We show that there is a negative
relation between the optimal growth rate and the concern for the environ-
ment. Third, we show that if the production structure of Lucas (1988) is
applied, long-run growth is not influenced by environmental preferences. In
section ~1 we extend the Lucas mode] (1988) further by assuming pollution ef-
fects on the production structure. Human capital accumulation is the engine
of growth and the learning ability of people can be influenced by environ-
mental issues. This model points out how an increased willingness to clean
up pollution can stimulate growth. Finally, section 5 summarises and gives
some suggestion for future research. The appendix contains full derivations
of the model equations used in the text.
2. Optimal Growth Theory and Pollution
To study the effects of environmental care on optimal growth rates and
technology choice, we consider an economy where pollution damages social
welfare. Hereby, we build on the analysis orginally invited by Forster
(19~3) and later on worked out in more details by Luptacik and Schubert
(1982) and by Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991). Pollution is an inevitable
by-product of production, but can be diminished by devoting some part of
output to abatement activities. As a result, the society faces a trade-off
between consumption, growth and abatement, all of which contribute to inter-
temporal welfare and the sum of which is constrained by the level of output.
In the literature there is some discussion about the source of pol-
lution. Forster (1973) and Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) take pollution
as a linear function of production. Luptacik and Schubert (1982) have three
sources of pollution: consumption, production and the capital stock. For the
proposal of this paper we assume that the amount of pollution is a function
of the capital stock. However, the major conclusions of this paper concer-
ning growth are not affected by this choice. An other important question in4
the literature is whether pollution should be modeled as a stock or a flow
variable. In the earlier literature, e.g. Forster (1973) and Gruver (19~6),
the effects of the flow of pollution on welfare are considered. Luptacik and
Schubert ( 1982) consider the effect of the stock on welfare, while Van der
Ploeg and Withagen (1991) take both effects. Here we concentrate on pol-
lution as a flow.
Taking together our assumptions, the society's optimisation problem can
be written as
max, f e-9tU(C~L,P) dt,
0
Uc~O, Ucc~O, UPCO, UPPCO,
UcP~O' UccUPP - UcP~O (2.1)1
P - P(K.A). PK~O, PACO,
K- Y(K,hL) - C- A, K(0)- K0,
(2.2)
(2.3)
where 9, c-C~L, L, P, K and A denote the discount rate, per capita con-
sumption, population ( work force), (net) pollution, physical capital and
abatement activities. A subscript denotes a partial derivative, a dot
denotes a time derivative. Y represents output which is produced using
physical capital (K) and labour measured in efficiency units (hL). For
simplicity we ignore depreciation.
The social preferences and economic constraints outlined above are
maintained troughout the analysis, but regarding the exact production struc-
ture we consider different assumptions in turn. Before studying some
assumptions that are put forward in the endogenous growth literature, let us
first briefly consider the production structure of the traditional neoclas-
sical ( Cass-Koopmans) growth model.
1) Note that social welfare is assumed to depend on the utility of a representative consumer over an infinite horizon. We do not discuss the effects of dífferent weights on future generations or other intergenerational issues.5
Neoclassical model
In this case, the production function Y(K,hL) is of the Solow type with
constant returns to scale but diminishing returns to capital or labour
separatel.y. The supply of effective labour is exogenous at any moment in
time. The social optimal plan implies two optimum conditions:
Uc - LUPPA (2.4)
é,c - ~ lYK } ( UcPP } LUPPK)IUc, - (gtgL) } ~t, (2.5)
where gL~L~L and n~- Uc~cUcc i.e. the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution between current and future consumption. Equation (2.4) gives
the optimum allocation between current consumption and current abatement ac-
tivities. The marginal contributions to utility of both variables ~jre
equalised in the optimum. The marginal utility of abatement is multiplied by
the size of the population (L) because abatement affects pollution which has
a public good character. Equation (2.5) gives the optimum allocation between
current and future consumption. This allocation obviously depends on the
marginal contribution to future utility of consumption foregone, which can
be called the 'social interest rate', denoted by r. Saving adds to the cur-
rent stock oF capital and increases future output by YK. But future
consumption is lower valued if pollution grows (UcPP50). Moreover, a larger
capital stock leads to increased pollution which is a disutility (U P CO).
P K
Hence the social interest rate r is represented by the first term in long
brackets. It is optimal to postpone consumption (~~c~0) when r exceeds the
rate of time preference (9tgL). Of course, equation (2.5) is a version of
the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule. It diFFers from the traditional version
because of the wedge between the marginal product of capital (YK) and the
social marginal value of capital r. Taking together both optimum conditions
and defining r we can write
c~c Í- C~C - gL) -
1
YK t PK~PA - 3 P~P - ( 9 t gL)} n.
r- YK t PK~PA -~ P~P .
(2.6)
(~.7)6
where ~~ - PUcP~Uc.
In constrast with the interest rate, the long-run growth rate is solely
determíned by the technological opportunities and not by preferences or pol-
lution. Changes in preferences affecting PK~PA and ~ P~p are offset by
changes in YK. As long as capital input is growing faster (slower) than ef-
fective labour input, the marginal product YK declines (rises) because of
the diminishing returns to capital. Therefore, in a situation of balanced
growth (with r constant), the rate of growth of capital, output and
(aggregate) consumption will equal the sum of the growth of the labour force
and the labour augmenting technological change, gh, which are exogenously
given. This growth rate is equal to the rate in the Cass-Koopmans economy
wi.thout pollution.
Figure 1 illustrates the described effects on growth (g), marginal
value of capital (r) ,rnd physical marginal product YK. To set up this figure
we take a Cobb-Douglas production function and choose the following, admit-
tedly simple, specífications for utility and for pollution:
U(c,P) - ~n c - ~ P1}w.
w (2.8)
p(K'A) - (K~A)y' (2.9)
The social optimum is characterised by the following relations (see appendix
for derivation):
g - gh} gL' (2.10)
B - r - 8,
(2.11)
r- f~ Y~K - (Pá)1~N~ g t(1-~) Y,K ~l~u
(2.12)
where ~B is the production elasticity of capital and u~l.~r.ar,p)1. Equation
(2.10) gives the growth rate that is attainable ín the long run and is drawn
in the figure by the line labeled TECH. Equation (2.11) is the Keynes-Ramsey
rule for balanced growth (note that (2.8) implies ~-1 and ~-0). It is drawn
as the PREF-line giving the growth rate associated to any social rate of
return to saving and investment (r) that is desired given intertemporalpreferences. Finally, equation (2.12) defines the CAP-line giving for any r
the output to capital ratio that is desired in the long run and that is con-
sistent with optimal static allocation.
[ insert figure 1 ]
The solution for an economy where pollution effects of capital ac-
cumulation are not internalised (i.e. the Cass-Koopmans economy) is found by
setting p-0. Then, the marginal return to capital r is equal to the marginal
product of capital pY~K. Point M in figure 1 corresponds to this case. An
interesting question is what will change, if the society's prefences are
shifted towac~ds more environmental care (i.e. a shift from p-0 to Y1 or 1'rom
~pl to y~2). Long-run growth is not affected, because the growth rate in
neoclassical growth theory is determined by technological parameters. What
will change is, of course, the output to capital ratio. A larger disutility
of pollution (larger ~o) increases the wedge between marginal product and
social marginal productivity of capital. To attain the same social rate of
return on savings and investment, the marginal productivity of capital has
to rise to offset the increased disutility of pollution and therefore the
CAP-line shifts down. The economy will experience a transition period of
lower growth during which the capital intensity declines. Due to the
diminishing returns to capital the interest rate graduslly recovers. In the
new steady state the economy is transformed to a less capital intensive,
less polluting production process and r and g are ultimately unchanged.
j. Endogenous growth
In the p.revious section it is described how environmental aspects can
be incorporated in an optimising framework. Using the neoclassical produc-
tion structure, conclusions are drawn with respect to the optimal steady
state levels (per effective labour unit) of economic variables, given the
preference structure and the pollution process. To assess the effects of
pollution and abatement on the growth rate of various variables, the
neoclassical model is not suited because it assumes rather than explains8
growth. In the steady state, growth is always at the exogenously given
natural rate and changes in preference only affect levels.
Recent models yield more flexible and in our opinion more satisfactory
explanations for growth [e.g. Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Grossman and
Helpmann (1991), see Van de Klundert and Smulders (1991) for a survey]. In
these 'endogenous growth' models, technical change and accumulation of tech-
nical knowledge are the result of economic decisions regarding investment in
physical or human capital and R8,D activities. The production structure is
therefore different from the production structure in the neoclassical growth
model, where only physical capital can be accumulated subject to díminishing
returns. In endogenous growth models each kind of capital can be ac-
cumulated. This gives rise to constant returns to a broad concept of capital
including all reproducible factors of production. A faster rate of ac-
cumulation, due to for example a lower time preference, therefore does not
imply falling marginal returns. This implies that a permanently higher rate
of growth can be maintained at a higher but constant savings rate.
Within the 'class' of endogenous growth models the distinction can be
made between intentional and unintentional growth models. In the latter, the
accumulation of growth-generating knowledge is an externality for economic
agents. It arises rather mechanically as a side-product of investment (e.g.
Romer 1986). In the former, special efforts, resources and activities have
to be devoted to generate the knowledge needed for technical change and
growth [e.g. Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991)]. From both
categories of models we will take one exsmple and extend it to study the
relation between pollution and growth.
Rebelo model
The simplest model to illustrate endogenous growth is Rebelo's (1991)
model where production takes place with capital K only according to:
Y - a K
(3-1)
Here e ís the marginal return to the stock of capital (K) defined in a broad
sense. This return a is constant due to the fact that for example technical
knowledge arises from investment and learning by doing, offsetting9
diminishing returns to capital in a narrow sense. The parameter a can be
deperident on the size of the economy measured by the working force L as is
assumed in Romer (1986). In that specification L has to be constant to
guarantee baianced growth, which we will assume in this section. The
TECHnology line is no longer a flat line as in the previous section, but a
vertical line at a. The equilibrium rate of growth is found at the intersec-
tion of the technology line and the PREFerences line which is again the
Ramsey formula. A decline in time preference shifts the preference line to
the left and the growth rate is permanently higher.
Environmental issues can be incorporated in the same way as in the
preceding section by assuming a disutility of pollution which is a by-
product of the use of capital in production. The social optimum is found by
maximising social welfare function (2.1) subject to pollution function (2.2)
and goods market equilibrium (2.3) with Y(K,hL) replaced by Y-aK as in
(3-1)- This yields for balanced growth
~~c (- CIC - gL) - i a t PK~PA - 3 P~P -( 3 f gL) I rt. (3.2)
Comparing this result with the neoclassical case (equatíon 2.4), the en-
dogenous marginal product of capital YK is replaced by the exogenous a and
the growth rate is endogenous. Hence the wedge (PK~PA -; P~P) and the
growth rate g adjust to shifts in parameters. A rise in the preference for a
clean environment will widen the negative wedge between the marginal product
of capital and the social value of capital I PK~PA ~ t~ P~P and growth will
be lower.
To set up a figure like in the previous section we choose again
specif.ications (2.6) and (2.~) for utility and for pollution. In the appen-
dix we show r,hat the social optimum is characterised by the following
relations:
g - T' - ~?l ( a - r ) ~ ,








where r is, as before, the marginal social value of capital. Relation (3.4)
is again the Ramsey formula or PREF-line. Relation (3.3) defines the TECH-
line which gives the growth rate that is sustainable for any r in the long
run and consistent with optimal static allocation (of production over c~n-
sumption, abatement and investment). To understand why this line is upward
sloping, notice that a higher rate of investment (g) crowds out consumption
and abatement activities (per unit of capital). When as a consequence a
smaller part of the physical returns to capital has to be spent on
abatement, the return to capital r is larger2. Figure 2 depicts the three
relations.
[ insert figure 2 ]
Point M corresponds to the case in which pollution effects are not in-
ternalized (or p-0), point S1 (S2) to the optimum for p-p1 (p-p2), 'I'he
solution for p-0 can be interpreted as a market solution where no the pol-
lution effects are internalised. The more pollution effects are
internalised, the lower the value of capital and the growth rate. The reason
is that abatement activities are carried out which crowd out consumption and
investment. A rise in pollution disutility 9~ means that a higher priority is
given to less pollution and cleaning activities are intensified at the ex-
pense of current and future consumption. Thus, in the market economy there
is too few abatement and too high a pollution level and growth rate. The
capital-output ratio is not affected because the production function does
not allow for factor substitution.
The strong implications for growth and pollution from the Rebelo model
are rather specific and they will change when we turn to other growth
models. The first key assumption giving rise to the stong implications is
the absence oF factor substitution. Although we interpreted K as a broad
concept of capital, including various kinds of capital, all kinds are
2 From goods market equilibrium (2.j) follows: (CtA)~K -(Y-K)~K - a-g:
increased investment crowds out (CtA)~K and it is optimal to sprea~i this burden by reducing both C~K and A~K. Since the return to capital is r-
YKt PK~PA - a- A~K (cf. 2.5 and 2.~) reducing A~K means increasing r.11
treated symmetrically in the sense that each unit of capital contributes to
the same extent to pollution. In the remainder of this section we will con-
sider the endogenous growth model of Lucas (1988) where a neoclassical
production fuct.ion with labour and capital is used. That case is more com-
purtiF~l~r willi Llic annly:;is uf section Z: substiLuti.on between capital, WhiCll
causes pollution, and labour then affects the results. The second key as-
sumption is that factor productivity is not affected by the environment. If
there is a positive relation between productivity and a clean environment
(i.e. negative relation between a and P), the decline in the growth rate as
a result of a rise in y is smaller or even prevented since this adds a coun-
teracting force that shifts the technology line in figure 2 to the right.
These kinds of productivity effects are more likely to apply to labour than
to capital and we postpone a discussion to section 4 where we extend the
Lucas model.
Lucas model
In Lucas (1988), production takes place according to a neoclassical
production function (which allows us to reintroduce population growth).
However not only physical capital can be accumulated but also the skills of
labour or human capital. In the economy as a whole there are constant
returns with respect to all factors (physical and human capital) taken
together (i.e. with respect to the broad concept of capital), because of the
constant return to scale production function. A faster rate of physical
capital accumulation need not imply falling marginal returns as long as the
rate of accumulation of human capital is accelerated in the same time.
Lucas uses a two sector structure. The first sector is the production
sector producing consumption and investment goods. T'he second sector is the
research and education sector where skills, knowledge or human capital is
generated. Economic agents have to divide their time between production ac-
tivity and education. More education today lowers production today, but
increases production tomorrow because it raises the productivity of labour
and capital. There is therefore an incentive to pursue in learning ac-
tivities and the incentive is clearly dependent on intertemporal
preferences.12
Let us first explore environmental issues within the Lucas production
structure.
Y - Kp(~L)1-p (3.6)
h - E (1-u) h. (3.7)
Equation (3.6) is the production function of the production sector witt, u
the fraction of time devoted to production. Equation (3.7) is the 'Engine of
Growth' indicating that it is possible to attain a constant growth rate of
human capital (h) by devoting a constant fraction of time (1-u) to
education. Combining these relations with utility function (2.1), (2.6),
pollution function (2.~) and goods market equilibrium (2.3), the balanced
growth social optimum can be derived as
g - r - S. PREF-line, (3.8)
TECH-line, (3.9)
r - AYIK - (SDY)1~Lt~
a t (1-~)Y,K ]1~1~
CAP-line, (3.10)
where r is again the marginal value of capital. The intertemporal preference
relation between r and g (3.8) and the relation between the desired capital
intensity and r(3.10) are the same as in the neoclassical case because they
are derived independently of the assumptions regarding the growth of' human
capital. Equation (3.9) is the technology line which is a vertical line. It
can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition stating that the marginal
returns to investment in physical capital r equal the marginal returns to
investment in human capital. The latter are the sum of the exogenous mar-
ginal productivity in the engine of growth sector (e) and the growth rate of
labour (gL).
The three lines are depicted in figure 3. The upper part of the figure
is exactly the same as in Lucas original Formulation without pollution. Per
capita growth is stimulated by a decline in time preference (preference line13
shifts to the right) and by a rise in the productivity in the education sec-
tor (it bF,comes attractive to spend more time on education, human capital
grows fastcr raising the marginal productivity of physical capital and in-
voking a higher rate of accumulation of physical capital too). Environmental
preferences do not matter for the growth rate or 'interest rate', but only
affect the capital intensity. The reason is that internalising pollution
inFluences only the marginal value of physical capital and not of human
capital. Arbitrage between human capital accumulation and physical capital
accumulation ensures that the rate of return to physical capital equals the
exogenous rate of return to human capital. A rise in p lowers initially the
social value of physical capital, physical investment is slowed down and the
capital intensity in the production sector declines in such a way that the
increased marginal product of physical capital offsets the increased
disutility of pollution through capital. In the lower part of figure 3 tliis
is illustrated by drawing equation (3.10).
[ insert figure 3 J
The market solution can be mimicked by setting g~-0. Growth will be at
the same rate as in the social optimum but the capital intensity will be too
high. The reason is of course that the pollution effect of capital ac-
cumulation is not internalised. Agents will base their decisions on
rmarket-YK instead of r-YK - ~PK~PA~. By introducing a distortionary tax on
pollution the social optimum can be attained in a market economy3.
4. Health, pollution and growth
So far, we have studied only the implications of internalising the
direct negative aspects of pollution on social welfare. In fact, pollution
can also change production opportunities, e.g. by reducing the quality of
natural inputs or by increasing the deterioration of physical equipment. In
3 It is, however, doubtful whether pollution can be taxed. This gives rise
to the interesting question which instrument can be used optimally. This
is left for further research.14
this section we extend the Lucas (1988) model in the sense that we allow for
effects of pollution on the marginal returns to education. The idea is that
pollution affects health of workers, which lowers their ability to learn.
Empirical support for an example of such a relation between pollution and
human capital forr~ation is found in Margulis (1991). He first reports the
empirically significant correlation between lead in air and blood ]~ad
levels. Next he shows that children with higher blood lead levels have a
lower cognitive development and require supplemental education.
We assume that more pollution, e.g. in the form of smog, sir pollution,
ground pollution and nuclear pollution, causes human capital to depreciate
at a faster rate such that we can replace (3.7) in the extended Lucas model
of the previous section by
h - { E(1-u) - ~(P) } h, E~'(P) ) 0 (4.1)
where ~(P) represents th2 influence of pollution on the learning process.
The Keynes-Ramsey rule in the situation of balanced growth now reads
g - gL' { ( E t BL - ~ ( P~ ) ) - ( g } gL ) ~ (4.2)
where P~ is the steady state level of pollution. Compared with the previ.ous
case, the social marginal value of capital is reduced by ~(P}). A hígher
level of pollution diminishes the returns to education, reduces the
profítability to invest in human capital and growth falls. This effect is
equivalent to a decline in e by ~(P") in figure 3 which shifts the TECH-line
to the left. However, the level of pollution P~ is endogenous. To find the
equilibrium growth rate, we have to replace TECH-line of figure 3(equation
3.9) by the TECI{-relation that incorporates the effects of the optimally
chosen level of pollution on the sustainable growth rate. This relation is
derived in the appendix (equation A17) under the assumption that the
influence of pollution on human capital formation is linear (i.e. ~(P)-~P ).
For a wide range of reasonable parameters, this relation is shaped as in
figure 4. The TECH-line is in the present case hump-shaped rather than ver-
tical or monotonically upward sloping. A lower level of pollution as a
result of increased abatement leads to higher returns to learning ac-
t.ivities. Arbitrage between human and physical capital requires that thereturns to capital (r) are higher, too. This is accomplished by a rise in
the steady-state output to capital ratio (a rise in YK). Hence, there are
two counteracting forces on the growth rate. Inereased abatement activities
per unit of capital crowd out investment and lower the growth rate, but the
rise in output per unit of capital permits the growth rate to increase4.
The former effect dominates at the downward sloping part of the TECH-curve,
the latter at the upward sloping part.
Also the CAP-line is different from the CAP-line in figure 3. The pol-
lution effect on human capital formation adds to the negative effects of an
additional unit of capital. Therefore, to attain the same interest rate r, a
higher marginal product of capital (a higher Y~K ratio) is desired to offset
the stronger negative effects and the CAP-line shifts down compared with the
sítuation in figure 3.
Compared with the 'Rebelo case', the effect of a change in environmen-
tal preferences on the growth rate is reversed. A rise in ~ shifts the TECH-
line upward and the CAP-line downward. The equilibrium growth rate is
higher: more cleaning activities are preferred and investment becomes more
attractive. Investment can be higher because a rise in the output to capital
ratio prevents crowding-out effects. In a market economy (with a solution
mimicked by a very low value of ~5) the low private incentives to relieve
the society's pollution problem result in a growth rate that is less than
optimal.
The nature of the solution examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example. In the first column of table 1 the social optimum for
reasonable benchmark parameter values is given. If we compare these results
with t.he model of section 3 where human capital formation is not influenced
by the environment, the growth rate is lower and the 'interest rate' is
hi-gher (see the last column of table 1, which in fact gives a numerical
4 Cf. footnote 2. Here however, YK is given by ~Y~K instead of ~.
5 In contrast with the previous sections, the choice of the pollution
function does not allow to interpret the case where ~-0 as the market
solution because this would imply an infinite level of pollution and
negative growth. Of course, this is not a realistic case. Especially when
the level of pollution is very high, firms will internalise some of the
pollution effects. The outcome will be equivalent to the model solution
for a small value of ~.16
example corresponding to figure 3). The second column can be interpreted as
the market solution for the economy represented in column 1 where not all
pollution effects are internalised. Pollution is higher and growth is lower.
The third column corresponds to the shift from S1 to S2 in figure 4: the
society becomes more interested in cleaning pollution. The optimal growth
rate rises and pollution falls. To realise this change, pollution has to be
reduced by a decline in the capital intensity of the economy's production
process (Y~K rises) and a rise in the abatement ratio. The fall in the ~on-
sumption rate reflects the willingness to exchange current consumption for
less pollution and more future consumption.
[ insert table 1 ]
Another interesting example is what happens iF ~, the production elas-
ticity of physical capital, increases ( column 4). As the productivity of
capital rises relative to the productivity of labour input, it is optimal to
shift to a more capital intensive production process. This requires lac-ger
spending on abatement to mitigate the pollution effects (A~Y rises). T;iis,
however, does not fully prevent pollution to rise and growth to slow down.
Within this setting, an economy that is heavily dependent on relatively
capital intensive sectors of industry has to finance large cleaning ac-
tivities and to accept a lower growth rate.
If e increases we have the reverse: the economy described in column 5
has a comparative advantage in activities with high learning potential
relative to the economies described in the preceeding columns. Human capital
accumulation becomes more desirable, the economy shifts to a less capital
intensive and less polluting production technology and the optimal growth
rate rises.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate whether the optimal long-run rate of
growth is affected if society's preferences shift towards a larger concerr~
for a clean environment. The answer on this question depends critically on
the assumptions regarding production technology and the relation betweenpollution, prnduction and abatement. We focus on different assumptions
concerning production technology.
One case we study is that of a standard neoclassical production
function with substitution possibilities between the factors of production
that cause pollution (capítal) and the factors that cause no pollution
(skilled labour). Then, the preference shift results in a production process
that uses less intensively the polluting factor. We show that the economy
can sustain the pre-shift growth rate because of (at least) two reasons.
First, in the exogenous growth model, one factor of production (skilled
labour) grows at an exogenous rate and only this rate determines the natural
growth rate of the economy. Second and more interestingly, in an endogenous
growth model, each factor of production can be accumulated and long-run
growth remains unchanged if the productivity of the growth generating ac-
tivity is not affected by any change in pollution. We showed this in section
3 for the 'Lucas case' where human capital accumulation is the 'engine of
growth'.
Other assumptions on production structure can give rise to a relation
between optimal growth and environmental care. In section 3 we consider an
endogenous growth model along the lines of Romer (1986) and Rebelo (1991).
No transformation to a less polluting production process is possible and all
factors of production contribute equally to pollution. The optimal rate of
growth will be lower if pollution is more disliked because increased
abatement activities crowd out investment. A more realistic endogenous
growth model is presented in section 4 where the productivity of the engine
of growth is stimulated by a cleaner environment. In this case, the optimal
long-run growth rate is higher the more society is ready to devote resources
to clean up pollution.
The assumptions on the pollution process are ímportant for reaching
these conclusions. We assume throughout the paper that it is possible to
maintain a constant level of pollution by devoting a constant fraction of
output to abatement. Of course, growth would be more a problem if a constant
level or a constant growth rate of pollution was only sustainable in a
growing economy by devoting an increasing fraction of output to abatement.
It is worthwhile to work out this presumption, though we think it is not a
realistic case for the long run. If one believes that output growth is en-
dogenous because production knowledge can be accumulated without bounds, why18
should then investment in knowledge to clean the environment be subject to
diminishing returns ?
Many other relations between growth and environmental issues are to be
worked out. The most obvious from the point of view of the endogenous growth
literature is to extend the Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991)
model. T'hey argue that it is necessary to devote activities and resources to
a research sector to generate the knowledge that is necessary for growth.
The model resembles much the Lucas (1988) model, but now research and
development is the engine of growth rather than human capital formation.
Analogous to this model one could argue that there is a need for special R~.D
activities aimed at the development of cleaner production methods, dissol-
vable plastics, efficient abatement technology, etc. A shift in preferences
for the environment will cause a reallocation between the production sector
and the RB~D sectors. Our guess is that if the increase in the size of the
environmental R~D sector crowds out other R~D activíties, growth can be
hurt.
There are various other issues that can be explored. One regards the
choice of instruments to attain the social optimum in a decentralized
economy, which is especially interesting in case pollution itself can not be
measured or taxed. Further it is worthwhile to consider the international
aspects of environmental spillovers and pollution location, especially in
case preferences for the environment differ across countries.
Appendix
The symbols are defined as in the text, unless otherwise indicated.
To derive the TECH, PREF and CAP relations, social welfare (equation (2.1))
is maximised with respect to C, A and u, subject to (2.3) (goods market
equilibrium), (2.8) (instantaneous utility), (2.9) (pollution function) and
Y- a KS (uhL)1-~, production function, (A1)
h~ h~h - E(1-u) - ~P -F gh, engine of growth, (A2)
0 s u s 1, time contraint. (A3)19
The essential parametrical restrictions for the neoclassical model are
OCgCl, E-0, ~-0, for the 'Rebelo model' g-1, and for the 'Lucas model'
OtgCl. For convenience we normalise oc-1 in the neoclassical and Lucas model
and we set gh-0 in the 'Lucas model'. Moreover, with E-0, u will be choosen
at its maximum value so that u can be treated as a parameter in the neoclas-
sical case wíth u-1. For the 'Lucas case' we restrict the analysis to
combinations of parameter values for which the restrictions in A3 are never
binding. To abreviate notation we define u-1t~r;yy~ and wríte x for the growth
rate (z~x) of any variable x. The present value Hamiltonian is
H- e-9t r ln L- i~w (A~K)-X(1tW) ~ O1 a KS (uhL)1-R - C- A J 1 1
l . 02 e(1-u) -~(A~K)-~ . gh J
h I.
The optimum conditions read (after some slight rewritting to facilitate
later substitutions):
~C - 1~C - O1 - 0, (A4)
~A - (~à' ÍA,K)-u } (02h) D~~ (A~K)w~-~, K-1 - O1 - 0. (A5)
~u - (1-R)Í~1K)~ - E(~2h) - 0, (A6)
~K - O1F1(Y~K) - IPë (A~K)-x t(02h) Y~ (A~K)w~-~J ~- 901- O1. (A7)
~h - (1-g)(O1K)YhK t 02h - 802 - 02 . (A8)
where O1 and OZ are the shadow prices associated to physical and hiiwan
capital respectively. Variable r is defined as the marginal social value of
capital in terms of utility:
1 ~H
r - Ol ~K '
Using (A~), (A5) and (A4) this can be written as
r- A YíK - A~K (- 8- 01- 9 t C). (A9)20
The conditions for balanced growth, i.e. constant growth rates and
ronstant allocation, are
Y- C- A- K- g, allocation in goods market, (A10)
h' I, - K. Y~K constant, (All)
-O1 - K, -02 - h, O1K, 02h constant. (A12)
Condition (A10) follows from (A9), then (All) follows from (A1) and (A12)
follows from (A5), (AS) and (A10). To eliminate (02h) use (A8) and (A12) to
6
get 02h -(1-(3)(O1K) (Y~K)~9, which yields together with (A5) and (A4)
o1K - s~~ ~(A~K)x - ~(1-~)~(Y~K)(A~K)~, - K .
1 (A13)
Now use (2.3), (A13) and (A10) to derive (A14) and use (A~), (A5) and (A12)
to derive (A15).
Y~K - ~~ ((A~K)u - ~(1-p)~(YIK)(A~K)~, ; A~K t g (A14)
r - g } g (A15)
Equation (A15) is the PREF-relation. Equations (A9), (A14) and (A15) can be
reduced to a relation between the variables r and Y~K which is the CAP-
relation. Note that if ~-0 this yields (2.12) and if E)0 and ~)0 this
relation cannot be solved analytically.
To derive the TECH-relation (2.8) for the neoclassical case, use (All),
(A2) aiid the appropriate parametrical restrictions. For the 'Rebelo case',
the TECH-relation (3.3) is derived by setting g-1 and substituting (A9) and
(A1) (i.e. Y~K-o~) into (A14). To derive the TECH-relation for the 'Lucas
case', differentiate (A6) which yields O1. g- 02- h- 0 and substitute into
f~ Formally the equality sign does not apply in the neoclassical case since u-1 will be binding. However (A13) is still valid because ~-0 in the neoclassical case.2i
this expression equations (A9), (A12), (A8), (A6), (A2) and (A10) which
yields (8-r) . g - [g-h-(e-h-~P)] - (g-L) - 0. This implies
r - E { L - ~(A~K)-~. (Ai6)
With ~-0, (A16) yields relation (3.9). With ~)0, (A16) can be used to
eliminate A~K and (A9) to eliminate Y~K which yields after substitution in
(A14)
g - ~ t g a - ~~ { au - ~(1-~)~Ir~aJ
awó ~.
where a - (~~(etL-r))1,~ (-A~K). l
(A17)
(A18)
Equation (A17) represents the TECH-relation between r and g as is drawn in
Figure 4. Since only points at which C~K Z 0 and A~K 2 0 are meaningful, r
has to be restricted to r-s r s r} where r}-etL (from A18) and r- solves C~K
- { au - ~(1-S)(,y~9) [(rta)~~] aw~ }~py - 0 (from A13). From (A17) it is
clear that two TECH-lines drawn in a(r,g) plane for different values of p
intersect at r- and that the one with the higher value of ~ is above the one
with the lower as long as the term in (A17) between accolades is positive,
i.e. as long as C~K Z 0.22
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